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HUMAN RIGHTS AND/OR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: WHICH WAY AFRICA?
Kivutha Kibwana"

I. Introduction
Political leadership in Africa is currently embracing a stance
which ensures that human rights merely find accommodation in
constitutional and other legal text. Many Governments talk human
rights (as a public relations gimmick) as they concurrently embrace
anti-human rights practice(s). Indeed, in some African countries,
political leadership expresses disquiet when human rights as described
in constitutions and other laws are popularized among the masses by
constitutional lawyers and activists. Some publicists have now begun
to resuscitate an earlier jurisprudence which argued that in Africa
human rights should be subordinated to the dictates of development.
Such jurisprudence favored development first, human rights
afterwards. The above position, as indicated, is not new in Africa.
In Julius K. Nyerere's Tanganyika it was successfully argued that an
enforceable Bill of Rights in the Constitution would act as a stumbling
block to speedy economic development since government's hands
would be immobilized by human rights concerns, thus disenabling
government from pursuing policies aimed at ushering in development.
From 1961 to 1985 Tanganyika/Tanzanian constitutional structure
lacked guaranteed human rights.
In this paper, we wish to examine the argument that in the
developing world - and particularly Africa - the dictates of
economic development require a de-emphasis of human rights
promotion because enjoyment of human rights and procurement of
economic development will inevitably clash whereupon priority should
be accorded to the latter.
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H. Conception of Human as Understood by Different Groups
and Social Classes
Human rights discourse often assumes babellian character; hence,
genesis of an elastic concept of human rights.
Many Third World governments - African ones included - and

some constitutional lawyers believe in the Cartesian delimitation and
that general emphasis on human rights served the major purpose of
differentiating Western and non-Western countries' perception and
treatment of human rights. The Western world, particularly America,
it is argued, sought to impose her perception of human rights as
primarily constituting political and civil rights on the whole world.
From the American perspective then, both Eastern Europe and the
Third World lagged behind in human rights practice to the extent that
Western standards were not adopted. Many African governments then
saw and now see such a concept of human rights as merely providing
a yardstick to criticize and/or evaluate their performance not from a
universalist standpoint of human rights but merely from a Western
perspective. Western preoccupation with human rights, the argument
continues, was outward; discussion and discourse on the Western
European scene was, on the whole, downplayed. Moreover, the West
has often supported groups and governments which clearly violate
human rights such as RENAMO, racist South African and dictatorial
regimes in Africa (Amin, Bokassa, Nguema benefitted from regular
foreign aid) while friends of the West are not censured appropriately
for human rights violations.
African governments, as we have suggested above, more often
than not pay lip service to human rights because aid donors make it a
conditionality explicitly or implicitly for development aid. It is
therefore not systematically recognized that popularization of an
adherence to human rights by the African governments can be a source
of political security, stability, and a sine qua non of economic - and
general - development. Consequently, when citizens insist on
obedience by government, government officials and fellow citizens of
human rights law, other constitutional precepts and the law generally,
they are characterized as radical-dissidents. Governments thus prefer
a position where they can leisurely pick and choose which human
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rights - and the measure - they will allow citizens. The Bill of
Rights is suffered in the Constitution because it would attract too much
international attention and censure to scrap it. However, major
amendments are introduced to ensure survival of a skeletal and lifeless
Bill of Rights elaborately punctured by "claw-back" clauses. The
argument is also advanced that human rights are a Western concept
inapplicable in Africa. Some of the sophisticated publicists argue that
human rights - particularly the political and civil variant - are a
product of bourgeois struggles. The bourgeoisie identified and
described such rights and struggled for them in revolutions against
feudal Europe. Since there are not the corresponding feudal and
bourgeois classes in Africa, such bourgeois human rights have no
place. At most, the rights were simply admitted into the constitutions
to ensure speedy independence by assuring protection of the bourgeois
interests of white and other foreigners. Also, African political leaders
do point out that human rights are indeed enjoyed in their countries.
In particular such rights are enjoyed by those in the ruling groups upper middle and upper class - although the governments indicate
that the rights are enjoyed by all citizens.
As far as Western governments and human rights organizations
such as Amnesty International are concerned, human rights observance
abroad is essential for the creation of minimum conditions necessary
for political stability which will ensure capitalist development, suitable
climate for foreign investments, avoidance of revolutions and spread
of political systems antagonistic to the West, and improvement of
quality of life of the concerned countries' citizens. Hence the West is
interested in human rights development in Africa and elsewhere
primarily due to self-interest and altruism in that order.
For the non-ruling class(es) competing for power in Africa,
human rights observance creates the environment within which
political activity is possible. Such segment(s) of society argue(s) that
in Africa a proliferation of feudal-type regimes exists whose endemic
authoritarianism and arbitrariness must be curbed by a regime of
human rights resembling or even identical to the ones the bourgeoisie
in 17th century and 18th century Europe fought for. Also, since the
majority of the countries are developing a nascent capitalism analogous
to that which the bourgeoisie in 17th and 18th century Europe were
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struggling to establish, a regime of generalized rules in Africa,
particularly in the human rights plane, can contribute to the creation
of the necessary political and general enabling environment for similar
bourgeois capitalist development. Moreover, even among ruling
groups, some of the factions not directly linked to the Chief Executive
need the protection of a stable regime of human rights to shield them
from harassment and annihilation during intra-class struggles.
For the masses, human rights is a very practical constitutional
good. Proper articulation, nuturement and observance of human rights
facilitate a freer life and the basis for incremental assault on economic
deprivation. To ordinary citizens, therefore, human rights is not about
mere ideology, discourse, etc., but rather a practical bread-and-butter
issue.
III. Human Rights Defined
Human rights - which consist of several types - are those core

or fundamental rights which accrue to the individual and/or group in
society to ensure autonomy and full realization of such individual or
group in society's life. Observance of human rights ensures absence
of arbitrariness, oppression, suppression, etc. and incrementally
promotes existence of a rational society.
Until recently, human rights were categorizable in terms of
political and civil rights on the one hand and economic, social, and
cultural rights on the other. Political and civil rights emphasize
personal and group autonomy as contrasted to too much (pervasive)
government. They thus ensure that government gets off the backs of
the people so that the people can enjoy democratic space. Economic,
social, and cultural rights promote welfarism under which governments
are able to grant work, health, education, etc. to their citizens.
Recently, and particularly in the Algers Declaration of the Rights of
Peoples and the OAU Charter of Human and Peoples Rights,
articulation of a third species of rights described as third generation
group rights occurred. These complement economic, social, and
cultural rights but are broader. They include the right to satisfactory
working environment, the right to a healthy environment, self-
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determination and sovereignty, the right of a country to her natural
resources, the right to development, etc. On the whole, these are
rights for which developing countries are presently agitating since the
developed world can be said to enjoy most of them.
In agreement with most publicists, our definition of human rights
encompasses all three species referred to above. Ideally, the best
scenario is one in which a country can demonstrate provision and
adherence to all three species of human rights. However, we are
aware that in given historical epochs, a country may emphasize a
certain species of human rights or even specified human rights because
of the then existing level of development of the country. Such
emphasis, however, as we shall argue, does not mean that human
rights are not best conceived holistically.
Also, the different species of human rights interact dialectically.
Economic, social, and cultural rights and third generation group rights
(which are a higher order species of economic rights) lead to the
existence of political and civil rights; whereas, where an abundance of
political and civil rights exists, it is easy to debate on how best to
secure economic, social, and cultural rights, to organize society more
democratically for furtherance of economic development. We shall
return to this point.
Each of the human rights categories and human rights generally
are growing entities. As society develops, new human rights spring
to life or new emphasis on existing human rights leads to some human
rights acquiring new prominence. We have so far argued that there
exists mistrust and thus de-emphasis of human rights by governments
in Africa. On the whole, not all species of human rights are enjoyed
by citizens in Africa. In ensuring Africa enjoys economic, social, and
cultural rights - or development - it will be necessary to realize both
the third generation rights and political and civil rights. Third
generation group rights will expand the capacity of Africa's economics
to provide economic, social, and cultural rights. Existence of political
and civil rights will ensure, inter alia, discussion and planning on how
best to develop Africa economically.
Among Africa's political and civil rights and third generation
group rights, it is essential to introduce a hierarchy and therefore a
basis for emphasis. Such exercise may even involve bringing some
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rights to the fore or suggesting emergence and existence of new rights.
In the political and civil rights arena, Africa will emphasize the
following:
the right to rule of law and constitutionalism;
the right to expression and public debate;
the right to organize;
the right to bonafide electoral choice;
the right to meaningful participation in the nation's political life;
the right to law;
the right to access of independent judicial organs.
The right to expression and public debate includes the right to a
free press. Such right ensures that the people know the problems
confronting their country and the continent including externally
derived problems. The people must feel they are parties to defining
and redefining their problems as well as offering solutions. The right
to organize covers political and labor domains.
Citizens must be able meaningfully to organize politically and also
on the basis of labor without governmental hinderance or paternalistic
superintendency. To ensure that the right to political participation is
given meaning, literacy and general enlightenment of the population
must be pursued. Many governments are yet to tap the spirit and
energy of their peoples in creatively solving the problems confronting
the continent. Often, this is because an enlightened and aware
citizenry is seen as a hindrance in governance rather than as an asset.
Also, future writing on the subject should popularize the notion that
a right to legal literacy exists which is part and parcel of the general
right to rule of law and constitutionalism. These two latter concepts
are receiving much notoriety in the African context and they should
properly be seen as comprising a part of a fundamental right that
citizens can now demand and expect. Obviously for human rights to
be successfully vindicated upon negation, the right to access of
independent judicial organs is critical.
At the level of third generation rights, we need to emphasize the
following rights, that is:self-determination and sovereignty;
freedom from onerous debt;
freedom from imposition of externally derived economic policies;
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the right to an equitable international economic order;
the right to development.
Self-determination must be understood to mean more than
estrangement from colonial status; it must include the right to nondomination by superpowers in favor of mutually beneficial
cooperation. For sovereignty to be realized, economic viability of
Africa -

and generally Third World countries -

is necessary to

curtail subjugation of the economically weak by the advantaged. In a
scenario where the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
other international agencies chart out economic policies for Third
World countries, sovereignty will remain a mirage.
IV. Human Rights and/or Economic Development
The argument we are seeking to defeat runs thus. Pursuit of
human rights and economic development can be antithetical. Often
therefore it may be necessary to trade one off for the other. When
such tradeoff becomes necessary, human rights, being the lesser of the
two in importance in society, must give way. Only when Africa
reaches a level of sustainable economic development, will it no longer
be necessary to subordinate human rights to economic development.
On the whole, publicists and governments who argue as above
embrace a conception of human rights corresponding to political and
civil rights. The argument hence boils down to: freedom,
democracy, rule of law, constitutionalism, etc. should, when
necessary, be suspended or compromised to enable government to
achieve economic development for the masses. For example, in
Tanzania unwilling masses must be forced into socialist villages and
ujamaa socialism because objectively socialism is good and constitutes
development for the masses.
Many objections can answer to above reasoning. First, even if
human rights and development (even economic) were neatly separable,
analytically it would be very difficult to show why (and which) one
must be favored when a clash occurs. Who is to choose? What
criteria should be used to determine how priority between both is to
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be determined?
Even if such priority could be scientifically
determined, is it constant? If not, how is one to detect change?
Second, there is no demonstrable evidence that negation of human
rights, in some instances, can lead to enhancement of economic
development. Most of the publicists who argue as above merely allege
that negation of human rights may sometimes contribute to
enhancement of economic development. Perhaps this is so because it
may be an impossible task to prove the thesis.
Third, if it is true that in some occasions negation of human rights
can enhance economic development, one must also critically study the
situation when promotion of human rights enhances economic
development to determine why the same goal - economic
development - is achievable through two diametrically opposed paths.
Common sense would seem to suggest that only one path in this
instance can bring about economic development. At any rate,
proponents of the thesis under discussion must address the above
contradiction.
Fourth, evidence abounds to show that denial of human rights is
economically an expensive affair. Dictators in Africa and the world
over commit massive resources - particularly as regards mobilization
of security forces - into negation of human rights. If economic
development is being seriously sought, the bulk of such resources
could, for a start, be re-channelled into productive economic activity.
Fifth, citizens may prefer less economic development but a high
level of spiritual, intellectual, and cultural development. Economic
development per se may not be the most desired good in society. For
example, today environmental protection dictates abandonment of
some paths of economic development even where it is known they
would enhance productive capacity.
Sixth, a proper definition of human rights includes economic,
social, and cultural rights and third generation "development" rights.
The moment it is understood that human rights include economic
rights it is no longer possible to define human rights outside a context
of economic development.
We admit that human rights are attainable within a socio-economic
context. For example, the bourgeoisie in Europe was able to win
political and civil rights from feudalism in the 17th and 18th centuries
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because the necessary socio-economic conditions triggered by the
industrial revolution existed. Moreover, such human rights - and
liberal democracy generally - had a cultural background in Europe
which could sustain them. Also in Eastern Europe, an extensive
welfare system ensured the possibility of wide economic, social, and
cultural rights. In most of Africa, existence of political and civil
liberties are fragile, because strong classes do not exist capable of
obtaining such rights from the rulers. However, in countries with a
strong middle-class population, the conditions on political and civil
rights are developing. Some of the countries where multi-party
experiments are taking root have a significant middle-class population.
Moreover, as indicated earlier, dictatorial regimes with feudalistic
tendencies will attract pressure for observance of human rights from
the citizenry. Also foreign powers - particularly Western powers in order to safeguard their own interests wish to see development of
civil societies where they operate. Our argument is that conditions do
exist in Africa for the existence of civil and political right.
To argue otherwise is simply to be an apologist for systems which
negate human rights. Such argument sympathizes with and eloquently
supports authoritarianism. Therefore, any publicist who offers the
recipe of authoritarianism in the securing of development (!) must
know that he has simultaneously thrown overboard constitutional law
and constitutional government. Decades of authoritarian governance
in Africa, after a brief experimentation with democratic models at
independence, have yielded economic ruin, not development.
Even if one were to concede that the conditions which gave rise
to political and civil rights in Europe do not now exist in Africa, it is
too late in the day to deny people basic rights which have become trite
law in international and under municipal regimes. After all, such
human rights law was central in the definition of independence from
the colonial yoke for African countries. To argue today that such
rights have no economic, social, and cultural basis in Africa sounds
incredibly naive.
Earlier we suggested that an important linkage between human
rights and the international economic order exists. Currently the Third
World is at an impasse vis-a-vis provision, of economic rights - and
therefore development - for her peoples. More than ever before, a
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genuinely new international economic order is mandatory. Solution
of the inordinate debt problem must occur. Elsewhere we have
suggested that the world now looks upon Western Europe to urgently
initiate far-reaching measures to transfer some of her economic
advantage to the rest of the world. Fortunately, an environment now
exists enabling commitment of fewer resources to the arms race.
Continued provision of human rights and global political stability will
ultimately depend on the economic stability of each country. Often
African - and other Third World - leaders repress their populations
because they detest probing and public accounting regarding their near
solo participation in Africa's shrinking economies. Leaders abhor
opposition or the prospect of relinquishing power because political
power ensures proximity to a shrinking economic cake.
Further, if negation of human rights can bring about economic
development, most Third World countries would not be under
developed since their political rulers routinely negate human rights.
This is obviously not the case. In 1985, Tanzania did adopt a Bill of
Rights because she then considered herself developed economically.
Pressure for such inclusion emanated from within Tanzanian society.
Finally, to achieve economic development many inputs are
required. Suppression of human rights, even if admitted as one such
input, may not be material or controlling in the procurement of
economic development.
V. Factors Which Hinder Promotion of Human Rights
We have indicated that few African, leaders approvingly discuss
the human rights position in their countries. Most leaders view human
rights as an ideology or theoretical construct employed to criticize
their leadership. Such negative attitude arises due to several reasons.
Many leaders fail to recognize that provision of human rights in their
countries can act as a liberating and empowering force which can
place their countries on the path to bonafide development. Moreover,
the leaders are apprehensive that freedom attendant to provision of
human rights will be channelled into querying inequitable distribution
of political and economic power.
Because overstay in power
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guarantees short-term economic well-being, political leadership detests
challenge. It is true that the economic foundation for provision of
human rights in Africa is presently thin. To the extent that the West
is party to such shrinkage, the West must share blame in violation of
human rights in Africa, although ultimately primary blame lies on
Africans themselves. Demands by the West that Africa improve her
human rights position must acknowledge that the West is party to the
deteriorating conditions of human rights in Africa.
Because of some of the above factors, few human rights are given
expression by municipal law in Africa. It is fashionable not to adopt
international and regional human rights standards. For example, many
African countries have not ratified the OAU Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights even when its jurisprudence of protection of human
rights accords deference and much leeway to the individual country.
Where international and regional instruments are adopted, serious
attempts to be bound are not noticeable. Even within municipal law,
amendments routinely subtract the content of human rights. Also the
citizenry is not made aware of existing human rights and therefore is
not in a position to insist on observance. Furthermore, judicial
enforcement of human rights is compromised because the dependent
judiciaries are timid and often more executive-minded than the
executive in leaving violations unredressed.
V1. Factors Which Encourage Promotion of Human Rights
A' reversal of the factors mentioned above is necessary before
human rights articulation and promotion gains momentum in Africa.
We think that development of the middle class will be a great catalyst
in the development of not only human rights but democracy as well.
Such development must be supported by sustained growth of working
peoples' consciousness and pressure for a more democratic and
egalitarian society. Political leadership in Africa will only concede
human rights and democracy when there is adequate pressure for
them. Obviously, when the economic condition in Africa improves,
the requisite conditions for full-fledged political and civil rights as well
as the other genre of human rights will have been created. In order
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for such economic position to be realized, the West has a lot to
contribute. For a start, the West and the whole world community
must isolate perennial human rights violators and deny them economic
and other support. More critically, liberalization of the world
economy must now be prioritized so that a new international economic
order guarantees Africa and generally the Third World economic
viability. The West must now contribute to worldwide rehabilitation
instead of waiting for internal revolutions to usher in change.
In the meantime, African countries must explore their own
strategies for building viable economic systems and sub-systems.
Over-reliance on external economies must be desisted. Crucially
Africa must urgently explore the possibility of political and economic
unity. Europe has demonstrated that regional cooperation is the way
of the future. Africa has no option; unity is the rational path.
Lest it appear that we think external forces have the most to
contribute to the solution of human rights violations in Africa, we
wish to point out that political leadership in Africa must respect the
dignity of her citizens by ensuring adequate provision and protection
of human rights. If human rights provision and popularization
awakens the citizenry, political leadership can candidly explain the
nature of the problems besetting African countries instead of
pretending that problems do not exist. Communal solution of such
problems can then be attempted.
VII. Conclusion

Our major interest in this paper was to show that human rights,
however defined, cannot legitimately be sacrificed in order to achieve
development. Both human rights and economic development are interlinked and therefore inseparable. Even if theoretically they could be
separated, economic development devoid of political and civil rights
may not ultimately appeal to the recipients as the experience of
Eastern Europe may be revealing.
In order to ensure adequate protection of human rights in Africa,
political leaders will have to open up their systems so that more
criticism and a higher level of accountability are possible. Civil
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society must develop in Africa so that an enabling environment for
real development

-

economic and otherwise -

can exist.

Significantly, the West will have to participate in ensuring a foothold
of human rights in Africa by redesigning the world economic order so
that economic independence and viability is possible globally. A
sound economic basis will catalyze the development of human rights
in Africa.
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